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NSC BRIEFING

SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

- I. Sudden increase in Soviet efforts improve
 Yugo relations. Effort, itself, dates
 from Stalin's death, but heretofore casual:
 - A. June '53, ambassador appointed.
 - B. After that, some Satellites followed suit, /also made small trade deals.
 - C. Border incidents down.
 - D. Orbit anti-Yugo propaganda down.
 - II. In last weeks, Moscow's approach to Yugo both surprising, new:
 - A. Started (mid-September) use selected quotes from Yugo press, leaders: careful give Yugo support Soviet policy.
 - B. Anti-Tito clandestine radio off air (29 Sep); jamming Yugo broadcasts to Orbit stopped; anti-Tito books off shelves in Poland.

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- C. Last week (10th anniv. liberation

 Belgrade), USSR cheered Yugo

 partisans first time since '48 break.
- D. \$5 million deal between Moscow and
 Belgrade trade agencies signed
 1 October. Yugo also agreed to talks
 on more formal trade deal (Orbit trade
 now 5% Yugo total could exceed
 25% prewar figure).
- E. Soviet "cognizance" Trieste settlement partly reflection desire improve Yugo relations.
- III. Yugos not rejecting these moves: position--always willing normalize on basis equality.
 - A. Plan exchange Soviet, Yugo movies-would be first cultural propaganda
 interchange in six years.
 - B. Also okayed Soviet commercial overflights to Albania.

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- IV. Tito, other Yugo leaders on record that
 cooperation with West no bar to improved
 relations with East. Hold view that
 "equilibrium...had been created" wherein
 "East-West conferences" possibly fruitful.
 - A. Tito (16 October) stated will not "go back to Moscow."
 - B. Yugos will continue cooperation with West for defense.
 - C. Yugos approve European unification, even German rearmament. But simultaneously believe in negotiations with USSR, characterize Soviet policy of relaxing tension in Europe as "permanent."
 - D. Yugos take stand that, as socialist state, cannot join any organization (such as NATO) which primarily anti-

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- V. Tone of Yugo propaganda on USSR continues ameliorate:
 - A. 10th anniv, speeches still gave most

 credit to Yugo forces, mentioned

 Soviet-Yugo 'quarrels and disagreements.''
 - B. Had ceremony at Soviet-Yugo soldier's cemetery, but was "pretty dismal."
- VI. Soviet shift attributed to reevaluation policy toward Yugos, attempt block further Yugo shift West.
 - A. "Normalization" efforts of last year gained little--new moves needed counterbalance such West gains as Balkan alliance, Trieste settlement.
 - Soviet European policy, but also
 Kremlin may think especially productive
 for Communist Yugo; as test
 "deviationist" regime's responses; as
 preparation future offers; as easy means
 inflaming Western suspicions Yugo.

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- C. Moscow may plan eventually offer Tito some real bait for shift to East, but no signs yet.
- D. First will continue improve atmosphere.
- VII. Yugo self-interest appears bar return to East.
 - A. Tito now has virtual Western guarantee national security, plus military, economic aid, at no cost to independence, internal autonomy (Soviet control attempts were major cause '48 break).
 - B. Yugos see recent moves (getting out of joint companies, Port Arthur agreement)

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 as Soviet recognition necessity less

 interference internal affairs other

 states.
 - C. However, Tito and leaders still distrustful enough to discount any Soviet trustful enough to discount any Soviet perpage.

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that improved relations with Bloc
give leverage in Bargaining with
west.

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